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We much appreciate the interest in our paper shown by Derbyshire and Garnsey. The latter authors' work, based on a
deep knowledge of individual businesses over a long period of time, is an example to all wishing to understand temporal
volatility of new and small enterprises. Indeed, we view the paper by Garnsey and Heffernan (2005), which demonstrated
the scale, nature and diversity of temporal volatility, as a key intellectual building-block for our 2013 paper.2. The D&G critique1. What looks like randomness actually reflects the methods used – specifically the binary distinction between growth and
decline. The inclusion of the more nuanced concept of stasis or stability produces very different results.2. Sales are a poor measure of temporal performance of a new/small firm because they are so volatile.
3. Entrepreneurship is about uncertainty and not risk, so the coin-flipping analogy in which probabilities are known in
advance is not appropriate.
4. If growth paths are close to random then “there is little to be gained by further research effort”., Julian.frankish@barclays.com (J.S. Frankish), r.roberts.1@bham.ac.uk (R.G. Roberts),
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Our data constitute a random sample of New Ventures (NVs) in England and Wales. This is important for two reasons.
The first is that we make no claims that our results necessarily apply to established firms – large or small1. The second is
that, as we show elsewhere (Coad et al., 2014), almost all prior work on NVs has been based on convenient samples of firms
that are subject to up to 10 forms of bias. For this reason alone it is unsurprising that our emphasis on temporal volatility
differs from that of others, because this issue cannot be quantified in existing NV databases.
Our analysis is of 2814 NVs that survive until the end of the fifth year (not fourth). Since the first annual growth rate is
measured from year 1 to year 2 (i.e. log(sales)it log(sales)it1 for firm i in year t), and in order to calculate four consecutive
annual growth rates, we need data until the end of the fifth year. Thenwe examine survival into the sixth year on the basis of the
first four consecutive growth periods. In our baseline analysis we don’t exclude any firms on the grounds that they do not grow.
We calculate growth rates in the usual way (Tornqvist et al., 1985, see also Coad, 2009 for a survey) by taking log-
differences (see Coad et al., 2013, p. 621).
So, to be absolutely clear; we do not argue that NV growth paths are entirely random, but that they are close to random,
and that randomness is a considerably better approximation than determinism. Specifically we say:1 The
NV is r
2 We“We therefore suggest that it is an acceptable heuristic to consider that growth paths occur in approximately random
fashion, even if we observe some departures from a purely random benchmark that are significant in statistical
terms.” p. 623.We have some reservations about the data used by Derbyshire and Garnsey. Their TBM database is only just a bit larger
than the Value-Added Tax (VAT) stock, and so disproportionately covers larger starts and probably captures them later after
‘start-up’. It excludes the very smallest firms. The Barclays data covers a wider slice of the start-up population (only ex-
cluding the very smallest starts that do not even bother to open a business current account). This might be an important
distinction (although the authors do not challenge the unpredictability of outcomes per se).4. Responding to Derbyshire and Garnsey1. What looks like randomness actually reflects the methods used – specifically the binary distinction between growth and
decline. The inclusion of the more nuanced concept of stasis or stability produces very different results.
All organizations change over time but perhaps nowhere is that change so radical or rapid as in the NV. We are therefore
not comfortable with concept of stasis for two reasons.
The first is that it uses metrics that are too “clunky” to identify the scale of change that is actually occurring. So surely the
results presented by D&G for “S-S-S-S”, that 56.40% of NVs do not change over five years is counterintuitive?
The second is a measurement problem. Using their methods, D&G could easily increase the number of firms in the ‘stasis’
category by grouping firms into size categories of 1–9, 10–49 and 50þ employees. Movement between the categories
would then be minimal. Alternatively they could reduce the number of ‘stasis’ firms by using the number of work tasks,
or hours worked as shown on employee timesheets as a metric that would show a negligible number of firms are in
‘stasis’.
In our 2013 paper we had only two categories of firm performance in order to keep the analysis manageable (see also
Chan et al., 2003)2. Moving from 2 to 3 categories increases the number of categories from 16 to 81. We agree it is
interesting to move from 2 to 3 categories, provided this is done in a rigorous way. However, if the difference between
the three categories depends on an employment change of greater than 1 employee in magnitude, this makes it more
difficult for a single employee firm than for a 100 employee firm to leave the stasis group, which distorts the analysis.
Instead we prefer to define growth as the bottom third of sales growth, stasis as the central third, and growth as the top
third, so as to have three equi-populated groups. This analysis is carried out on our Barclays dataset, and the results are
presented below in Table 1. Each of the 81 possible growth paths is observed in our data. We see that the most highly-
populated category is “ssss”, four consecutive periods of stasis, which is observed for 103 firms. The relatively large
number of observations in “ssss” might perhaps be influenced by the fact that growth rate variance is lower for some
groups of firms such as larger firms (see e.g. Sutton, 2002; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006), such that larger firms are less likely
to be found in the categories of relatively fast rates of decline or growth. The three next most populated categories are
“sssg” (55 firms), “dggd” (46 firms) and “dgdd” (44 firms). Meanwhile, the three least populated categories are “ddsd” (11
firms), “sdsg” (13 firms) and “dsgd” (14 firms).
So, despite being the focus of so much entrepreneurship scholarship, there are only 40 surviving NVs that exhibit
prolonged growth (“gggg”). These constitute 1.8% of all surviving NVs and their numbers only slightly exceed the 32
surviving NVs that exhibit prolonged decline (“dddd”).recent paper by Anyadike-Danes and Hart (2014) clearly makes the point that the scale and nature of performance in the first five years of life of an
adically different from their performance in the next 10 years.
only became aware of Chan et al. (2003) after our JBV paper was accepted, which is unfortunate given the similarities.
Table 1
Replicating Table 1 in Derbyshire and Garnsey (2014) with the data in Coad et al (2013). Decline (“d”) corresponds to growth strictly lower than the
33.3333th percentile for each year (for the subsample of firms that survive until the end of year 5), growth (“g”) corresponds to growth strictly above the
66.6667th percentile, and stasis (“s”) is the category in between (with strict inequalities).
Growth
path
No. of
firms
Percent Growth
path
No. of
firms
Percent
dddd 32 1.47 gggs 30 1.38
dddg 42 1.93 ggsd 20 0.92
ddds 19 0.87 ggsg 24 1.10
ddgd 37 1.70 ggss 25 1.15
ddgg 40 1.84 gsdd 27 1.24
ddgs 30 1.38 gsdg 23 1.06
ddsd 11 0.51 gsds 19 0.87
ddsg 20 0.92 gsgd 24 1.10
ddss 36 1.65 gsgg 28 1.29
dgdd 44 2.02 gsgs 26 1.19
dgdg 40 1.84 gssd 23 1.06
dgds 21 0.97 gssg 25 1.15
dggd 46 2.11 gsss 30 1.38
dggg 28 1.29 sddd 37 1.70
dggs 26 1.19 sddg 32 1.47
dgsd 20 0.92 sdds 16 0.74
dgsg 25 1.15 sdgd 35 1.61
dgss 31 1.42 sdgg 17 0.78
dsdd 20 0.92 sdgs 18 0.83
dsdg 28 1.29 sdsd 17 0.78
dsds 16 0.74 sdsg 13 0.60
dsgd 14 0.64 sdss 36 1.65
dsgg 15 0.69 sgdd 20 0.92
dsgs 15 0.69 sgdg 31 1.42
dssd 17 0.78 sgds 20 0.92
dssg 21 0.97 sggd 21 0.97
dsss 31 1.42 sggg 16 0.74
gddd 38 1.75 sggs 15 0.69
gddg 33 1.52 sgsd 21 0.97
gdds 17 0.78 sgsg 15 0.69
gdgd 34 1.56 sgss 23 1.06
gdgg 32 1.47 ssdd 24 1.10
gdgs 24 1.10 ssdg 21 0.97
gdsd 18 0.83 ssds 21 0.97
gdsg 22 1.01 ssgd 22 1.01
gdss 18 0.83 ssgg 18 0.83
ggdd 35 1.61 ssgs 33 1.52
ggdg 22 1.01 sssd 27 1.24
ggds 26 1.19 sssg 55 2.53
gggd 41 1.88 ssss 103 4.73
gggg 40 1.84 Total 2176 100.00
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We acknowledge “there is no way of measuring an amount of expansion, or even size of a firm, that is not open to serious
conceptual objection” (Penrose, 1959, p. 199) but make the case that changes in sales are a better indicator for NVs than
employment headcounts for three reasons.
The first is because the latter is too coarse-grained to pick up variations. The second is that it is a much more clearly
articulated objective of the NV owner(s) to raise sales than to raise workforce size (Achtenhagen et al., 2010). The third is
that sales volatility has been shown to be a major influence on the survival/non-survival of NVs (Frankish et al., 2013),
reflecting the well-established observation that greater volatility requires greater access to finance to even-out fluc-
tuations in cash-flow. NVs with sales volatility, but limited access to finance, are therefore high risk.3. Entrepreneurship is about uncertainty and not risk, so the coin-flipping analogy in which probabilities are known in
advance is not appropriate.
We do not agree with D&Gs discussion of risk and uncertainty. The seminal article by Jovanovic (1982, p. 651) discusses
how entrepreneurs may know the distribution of outcomes even if they don’t know their individual random draw (i.e.
risk). However, a gambler in a casino may be uncertain about their total night’s winnings (i.e. uncertainty). We consider
that the semantics of risk vs uncertainty is not helpful here.4. If growth paths are close to random then “there is little to be gained by further research effort.”
We don’t take our observation that growth paths are close to random to imply that “there is little to be gained by further
research effort” (their Section 5). Far from it! What we do believe is that, given our current state of knowledge, the greater
risk is making inferences that key relationships are in place when the evidence to support them is thin. One example is the
A. Coad et al. / Journal of Business Venturing Insights 3 (2015) 5–88inference that entrepreneurs learn – defined as those with more experience in a prior business – and therefore perform
better than those without that experience. This “finding” has lead to a range of questionable changes – such as policies
making it easier for bankrupts to re-start – that are likely to be costly to implement and yet, in our view, will have minimal
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